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LESSONS FROM ENTERPRISE REFORMS IN CHINA AND 
VIETNAM  
Can stylized necessary conditions for the sustainability of socialist-oriented economic 
strategies be identified?1  
 
 
Alberto Gabriele – Independent investigator – gabrielealberto3@gmail.com 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper surveys a few key features of SOE reforms in China and Vietnam, focusing particularly on 
the evolution of ownership structures and on the relative weight of market regulatory mechanisms, and discusses 
their general implications for socialist development. It tentatively concludes that some broad principles informing 
and constraining any feasible socialist-oriented economic strategy can indeed be identified.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction: a stylized reassessment of a few key Marxian 
categories  
 
 
 
1.1.   Marx’s interpretation of the forces shaping the formation of average production costs, 
and hence of productive and unproductive labor, income distribution and the dynamic of capital 
accumulation, is still relevant to understand  some  basic features of the contemporary  
globalizing economy. More specifically, his (very few) observations on how to deal with inter-
sectoral and personal distribution under socialism are very helpful to realize the constraints 
faced by present-day socialist planners. However, a proper understanding of the renovation 
                                               
1 I certify that I have the right to deposit the contribution with MPRA 
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perspectives, the sustainability, and the very possibility of existence of socialism in the XXI 
century requires a new and partly modified utilization of some of Marx’s fundamental 
categories. I begin my argument discussing briefly those of Mode of Production (MP), Social 
and Economic Formation (SEF), and Law of Value (LV).2 
 
 
1.2.   A MP is a pattern of interaction between productive forces and social relations of 
production which broadly characterize and define the material base and reproduction of 
human civilizations over very long periods of time: “A mode of production is an articulated 
combination of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the 
relations of production” (Hindless and Hirst 1975, p. 9). Among many quotes from Marx 
himself,  the following is particularly telling: 
        “ The totality of… relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, 
the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which 
correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life 
conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life.” (Marx 1859, Preface). 
The whole edifice of Marx’s thought revolves around this key holistic and ontological 
category, to which he refers in most of his works, focusing to varying degrees on one or another 
of its multiple features and dimensions.  
Relative stability predominates in some periods, while other periods are characterized 
by the transition from one prevalent MP to another one. The relation between an MP’s 
universal/structural/ permanent features and its particularistic/ historically and geographically 
specific ones is not straightforward and simple. Any attempt to properly analyse and evaluate 
                                               
2 See Marx 1845, 1857-58, 1859, 1867, 1875, 1894. 
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such a relation requires difficult balancing and fine-tuning exercise, especially in the case of 
capitalism.  
 
 1.3.   Marx also introduced the less famous, almost obscure category of SEF (see Marx 
1859, Preface). Marx utilized the term rather sparingly, and in his own work he often attributed 
to it a meaning practically equivalent to that of MP.  Yet, in other cases he appears   attached 
to the term SEF a less universalistic and holistic character, arguing that diverse socio-economic 
formations can coexist and reciprocally interact in a global context characterized by the 
prevalence of a given MP. Their endogenous evolution and their mutual relations can 
eventually lead in the long term to a shift from one MP to another. Other thinkers in the 
Marxian tradition (among them Lenin and Althusser) subsequently re-interpreted the concept 
of SEF in a partly different and more restrictive way, that allows it to be rather clearly 
differentiated from that of MP. Among many other ones, I consider particularly valid Lorimer’s 
interpretation:  “ The SEF is… an integrated social system… the totality of relations of 
production in a SEF based on a distinct mode of production is almost never homogeneous - 
there exists alongside the dominant property form… other relations of production” (Lorimer 
1999:109-111).  The term SEF can be heuristically reinterpreted in the early XXI century as 
referring to social and economic “sub-sets” largely,  but not fully contained and constrained by 
a larger “set,” constituted by the prevailing MP. The latter, an all-encompassing category 
belonging to the very long period, is dominated by the principle of necessity.   
 
1.4.    The emergence and unfolding of SEFs takes place over long but relatively shorter 
periods of time, necessarily within the boundaries imposed by the structural characteristics of 
the slow-changing MP. The evolution of SEFs is strongly affected by changes in the 
superstructure, and in the consciousness and organization of social classes. Therefore, it is at 
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least partly characterized by the principle of freedom, while by its very nature the category of 
MP is dominated by the principle of necessity.  Each SEF ” is the specific complex of social 
relations of production and exchange obtaining in a certain country or group of countries 
during a long period of time “ (Gabriele and Schettino 2012, pp. 23-24), and as such  can differ 
significantly different from its counterparts in other countries. In each historically-determined 
SEF several MPs can (and usually do) coexist as different subsets. In this dimension, the SEF 
is characterized by the principle of generality and totality and each MP by those of particularity 
and partiality. However, at a more abstract and theoretical level, the opposite is true. The MP 
is characterized by the principle of generality and totality and each SEF by those of particularity 
and partiality. A small number of different MPs have slowly evolved over centuries and 
millennia, eventually prevailing over pre-existing ones in vast areas of the world. In doing so, 
they have been   informing, governing and organizing social and economic relations of 
production and exchange to various extents in myriads of relatively short-lived and 
geographically-limited SEFs.he contemporary world is characterized by the existence of 
multiple nation states and various forms of inter-state cooperation and rivalry, in a context 
where international trade and financial relations are predominantly market-based (see below, 
Section 2). International markets, in turn, are neither free nor fair or perfect, but they remain 
based on a global structure of production prices ultimately predicated on average production 
costs.3   
 
1.5.    According to Marx (who reformulated an approach common also to Smith and 
Ricardo)4 production prices are ultimately predicated on the foundations of the “Law of Value” 
                                               
3 Contingent supply and demand oscillations do play a role as well in the short and medium term.  
4 “Marx inherited the labour theory of value from the classical school.” (Mandel 2004). See also Sewell 2014a.  
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(LV). In general terms, the LV implies that the prices of goods and services are broadly 
correspondent to the amount of labour needed to produce them, taking into account the 
technology prevailing worldwide. In Marx’s terminology, this is equivalent to state that 
“normal” production prices5 ultimately correspond to the amount of necessary (direct and 
indirect) labour they embody, which also determines the macroeconomic magnitudes of total 
wages and surplus value. 6   
       Marx also argued that in any capitalist economy not all labour is productive (of 
productive of surplus value). In value terms, this means that unproductive workers (no matter 
how worth their work might be in terms of population welfare, as for public workers in health 
and education) must be ultimately subsidized by productive workers via direct or indirect 
taxation (see Marx 18637, 1861-64, Gough1972, Brooks 2005).   
In the economy of this paper, the LV is to be understood in broad and heuristic terms 
as an immanent principle that governs value creation and exchange in all capitalist and socialist 
                                               
5 This determination only appears clearly as an explication of medium and long-term price movements. In the 
shorter run, prices fluctuate around values as axes. Marx never intended to negate the operation of market laws, 
of the law of supply and demand, in determining these short-term fluctuations ( Mandel 2004)  
 
 
6After Marx’s death, many critics pointed out that a straightforward application of the LV  in its original 
form in order to calculate production prices led to formal logical contradictions. A long and often obscure debate 
ensued, the intensity of which peaked in the 1960s and 1970s but (as usual in the domain of economic science) 
never led to clear-cut conclusions shared by all participants.  In my view, the debate basically showed  that Marx’s 
theory of value was not exempt from logic aporias, but could be improved and developed in what came to be 
known as the “surplus approach”, (and, later, the “new interpretation approach”), which is both internally 
consistent and realistically suitable to interpreter the basic features of contemporary economies operating in the 
global modern MP framework (see Ritter von Bawerk E, 1898; Sraffa 1951, 1960; Garegnani 1984; Brooks 2002; 
Mandel 2004; Cesaratto 2012; Sewell 2014a,b; Pala 2015, Screpanti 2015).  
 In the remainder of this article, therefore, the term LV is not to be identified in a strict and formal fashion 
with the concept put forward by Marx in his pioneering XIX century contribution. Rather, it should be interpreted 
in a broad and heuristic sense - as its utilization is instrumental to the understanding of basic principles governing 
real-life contemporary economies - yet referring to a strong and robust concept that has been fully legitimated by 
the results of theoretical economic science.  
7 See, in particular, Chapter IV, Theories of Productive and Unproductive Labour. 
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modern economic systems that are underpinned  by commodity production and markets.    
While it is philosophically true that all economic value in human societies is ultimately 
generated by labour8, the LV is not to be interpreted as a mechanical algorithm aimed at 
calculating  an exact correspondence between quantity of labour and prices. 
 
1.6.     Marx realized that the LV cannot be superseded under socialism (at least, in its early 
stage9).  As a matter of fact, socialism was conceived by Marx as an intermediate stage where production 
is socialized, capitalist exploitation is eliminated, and the socialist distribution  principle “to each one 
according to her/his work” prevails.10 
Under socialism, the surplus is no longer privately captured. However, far from 
disappearing, it is collectivized and allocated to various forms of investment and social 
consumption.  In fact, in the Critique of the Gotha program, Marx envisaged that the early 
socialist society would need to divide the total social product into an (individual) consumption 
fund (distributed according to labor) and a surplus. The surplus shall be used to finance various   
“funds” needed for economic and social reproduction and accumulation.  
“the co-operative proceeds of labor are the total social product. 
From this must now be deducted: First, cover for replacement of the 
means of production used up. Second, additional portion for 
expansion of production. Third, reserve or insurance funds to provide 
against accidents… 
                                               
8 “Every child knows that any nation that stopped working, not for a year, but let us say, just for a few weeks, 
would perish… the things we need have to be produced in certain quantities and then distributed according to 
the requirements of society. This constitutes the economic laws of all societies, including capitalism…and  
every child knows, too, that the amounts of products corresponding to the differing amounts of needs, demand 
differing and quantitatively determined amounts of society’s aggregate labour” Marx 1868, Letter  to 
Kugelmann. pp.68-69. 
9 According to Marx, socialism itself was supposed to be only a transitional, very imperfect step on 
humankind’s way towards communism. Actually, the very raison d'être of socialism is the impossibility of 
jumping directly from capitalism to communism. Accordingly, in Marx’s view the prevalence of the LV would 
be dominant in the early stages of socialism, and it would progressively wither out as society was approaching 
communism. 
10 Of course, this is not tantamount to say that each worker personally obtains the full product of his work (see 
below, the rest of this subsection).  
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These deductions from the "undiminished" proceeds of labor are 
an economic necessity… 
There remains the other part of the total product, intended to serve 
as means of consumption. Before this is divided among the 
individuals, there has to be deducted again, from it: First, the general 
costs of administration not belonging to production. Second, that 
which is intended for the common satisfaction of needs, such as 
schools, health services, etc.11 From the outset, this part grows 
considerably in comparison with present-day society, and it grows in 
proportion as the new society develops…12. Third, funds for those 
unable to work, etc. 
Only now do we come to the "distribution" … namely, to that part 
of the means of consumption which is divided among the individual 
producers…Here, obviously, the same principle prevails as that 
which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is 
exchange of equal values. Content and form are changed, because 
under the altered circumstances no one can give anything except his 
labor, and because, on the other hand, nothing can pass to the 
ownership of individuals, except individual means of consumption. 
But as far as the distribution of the latter among the individual 
producers is concerned, the same principle prevails as in the 
exchange of commodity equivalents: a given amount of labor in one 
form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another form13.” 
(Marx 1875)14. 
 
 
1.7. In The state and the Revolution, (1917a), Lenin referred approvingly to the Critique 
of the Gotha program, and fully shared its argument and conclusions: 
 
What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it 
has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as 
it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, 
economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks 
                                               
11 Workers in these sectors (which are necessarily public under socialism) are non-productive   in Marxian 
terms.  
12 Historical experience confirmed this prediction.  Socialist –oriented and, more generally, progressive 
governments have always attached a high degree of priority to social spending. 
13 Marx clearly recognizes that  early post-capitalist societies, due to their very 
underdevelopment,  could not go beyond this socialist distribution principle. Yet, 
he stigmatized its ethical and humanistic limitations, due to the fact that individuals’ 
working capabilities and needs are uneven:    
 
14 My emphasis. 
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of the old society from whose womb it emerges. Accordingly, the 
individual producer receives back from society -- after the deductions 
have been made -- exactly what he gives to it….The same amount of labor 
which he has given to society in one form, he receives back in 
another15…Here, obviously, the same principle prevails as that which 
regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is exchange of 
equal values. Content and form are changed, because under the altered 
circumstances no one can give anything except his labor, and because, on 
the other hand, nothing can pass to the ownership of individuals, except 
individual means of consumption. But as far as the distribution of the 
latter among the individual producers is concerned, the same principle 
prevails as in the exchange of commodity equivalents: a given amount of 
labor in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another 
form.” (Lenin 1917)16. 
 
Consistently with Marx’s and Lenin’s approach, any modern economy can be seen as being 
constituted by two macro-sectors: the productive macro-sector, which comprises productive 
workers, and the non-productive macro-sector, which comprises non-productive workers. The 
latter includes all public services, among them essential ones such as health and education, 
which crucially contribute to people’s human development both directly and indirectly (via 
their impact on human capital formation), and the financial sector.he productive macro-sector 
generates a surplus (i.e., surplus value). Conversely, the non-productive macro-sector does not 
sell the bulk of its output at market prices. Thus, the government must engineer a net transfer 
from one macro-sector to the other via direct and indirect taxation.The proper handling of this 
inter-macro-sectoral relationship is a key strategic and policy issue. The non-productive macro-
sector, differently from the productive one, should as much as possible be managed and 
regulated directly by the state via non-market policy tools. Financial services, in particular - 
                                               
15 Here Lenin appears to envisage a socialist society where money and the exchange of commodities have been 
replaced by labour certificates that entitle workers to directly draw consumption goods and services from a 
centralized consumption fund. Yet, he notices that distribution of means of consumption among individuals  
“the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity equivalents”. In practice, no real-world post-
revolutionary society has ever fully superseded money, commodities  and  commodity-monetary relations. 
16 My emphasis. 
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due to their central role in determining investment, employment, and growth - should as far as 
possible be run as a public service as well.17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Socialism under the Modern Mode of Production  
  
2.1. In the Introduction  I have exposed selectively some basic tenets of Marxian thought on 
some crucial categories (such as MP, SEF, LV, productive and non productive labor, the 
persistence of commodity-like exchange and distribution principles under socialism) which I 
consider still very relevant for the understanding of the globalizing world economy in the 
XXIth century. 
Conversely,  I maintain that a number of historical lessons from the XXth and the early 
XXIth century require a novel and partly modified view of the prevailing MP in the 
contemporary era – thereby departing from orthodox Marxist tradition while maintaining a 
methodological fidelity to its inspiration.  
The main lessons, in extremely synthesized terms, are as follows: 
i) Attempts to bring about a socialist-oriented global political revolution, that might 
have brought to power almost contemporarily socialist forces in all (or many) 
                                               
17 If left to private agents and market forces, eager to capture ever-increasing portions of socially-
produced wealth, the expansion of financial capital tends to worsen income distribution and engineer  disruptive 
systemic crises.   
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advanced capitalist countries, did not succeed. A full-fledged overhauling of the 
global dominant MP over a historically very short period (i.e., one or two 
generations) looks impossible nowadays, contrarily to the belief of many Marxist 
and other revolutionaries of the XIX and early XXth century.   
ii)  A corollary of i) is that the very conception of the nature and feasibility of socialism  
(which was previously strongly imbued with a holistic and, in some cases, 
millenarian and scatological aura)  must be interpreted in a more limited and less 
ambitious fashion, acknowledging the inevitability of the long-term persistence of 
multiple contradictions in the context of  any socialist-oriented historical process. 
It is therefore preferable to avoid discussing about socialism/non-socialism in the 
framework of an essentialist, dichotomist, black and white approach, realizing that 
in many cases the evaluation of concrete socioeconomic realities is to a large extent 
a matter of degree and of value judgement, and that a large gap  often separates 
reality from intentions (both subjectively and objectively). In this context, heuristic, 
approximate and ad hoc terms and analytical tools can be of practical use to grasp 
the basic elements of otherwise excessively complex and contradictory objects of 
study. For this reason, I utilize in some parts of this article terms such as positive 
and normative criteria18, socialist-oriented19, and even “socialisticity”20.  As a 
                                               
18 Positive criteria represent structural features of social production relations, such as the relative weight of the 
State and of the market respectively, the distribution of the ownership of the main means of production, and  the 
class(es), or social group(s) controlling the economy as whole, and determining the joint process of 
accumulation and technical progress.  Normative criteria represent the degree of achievement of intermediate 
(e.g., GDP growth, GINI coefficient) and final goals (such as poverty elimination, universal satisfaction of basic 
needs, equity in opportunities, an ethically and socially satisfactory income distribution, environment 
protection). One country might be seen by some analysts are more socialist according to some of these criteria, 
and less according to other criteria. Other analysts might  legitimately interpret the same evidence in a different 
way (see Elliot 1978, Gabriele and Schettino 2012). 
19 The term “socialist-oriented “ is  a useful one in discussing the objective reality of many countries according 
to various positive and normative criteria, without implying a definitive  value judgement on whether they are in 
fact socialist or not. 
20 Degree of approximation to socialism proper, according to positive and/or normative criteria.  
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matter of fact, in my view, excessively simplified statements such as this or 
“country a (or b, or c) is socialist” or “ is not socialist” are off the mark. Conversely, 
prudent statements such as “country a is more “socialistic” than country b from the 
vantage point of modernizing its governance of the economy in order to suit the 
objective degree of advancement of its own relations of production and exchange, 
thereby effectively combating poverty, but is less socialistic with respect to the 
degree of equality” are more likely to be meaningful and scientifically defendable21. 
 
2.2.    Since the Russian Revolution, there have been many instances where socialist forces 
have gained power in relatively backward peripheral countries22, characterized by embryonic, 
immature, dependent and /or colonial forms of capitalist development. Subsequent attempts to 
build socialist economies in these countries have struggled with extraordinary hurdles, 
stemming to a large extent from the very underdevelopment of productive forces, on one hand, 
and – for a long time - under conditions of isolation and of very harsh hostility on the part of 
the advanced capitalist powers. However, at least in some cases, these national experiments 
have exhibited a rather high degree of depth, radicality, consistency and resilience. Hence, in 
my view, they constitute (or constituted) examples of socialist-oriented SEFs. 
Most of these pioneering attempts eventually collapsed under the combined pressure of 
external aggressiveness and internal contradictions.  Without underestimating the weight of 
the former, or the important achievements of the USSR and other European socialist countries 
in areas such as the universal provision of housing, food and basic services, “Soviet-style 
                                               
21 Even taking into account the relative weak definition of science itself  which is (rightly) prevailing in the 
domain of social sciences. 
22 The socialist-oriented processes launched in relatively advanced capitalist countries such as East Germany 
and the Czech Republic, apart from having been  essentially  a by-product of the Cold War rather than of home-
grown political processes, also took place under conditions of isolation and hostility from the advanced 
capitalist powers. Hence, they faced difficulties not so different from those of other communist-run socialist 
construction attempts. 
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command economies proved to be too rigid to be able to absorb from outside, internally 
generate and diffuse innovations in a satisfactory manner” (Gabriele and Schettino 2012, p. 
28). 
Conversely, communist parties formerly supported by the USSR maintained power in 
China and in a few other developing countries. In other developing countries, socialist forces 
climbed to government via the ballot box, and embarked in broadly socialist-oriented 
development strategies with different degrees of success and sustainability. In the vast majority 
of cases23 (and, arguably, especially so in the most successful ones) socialist-oriented 
development strategies are being implemented under conditions very different from those of 
the past. Externally, these countries  are far less isolated from the capitalist world than it was 
the case for the USSR and Mao’s China, and actively strive to integrate their national 
economies  with   global trade, financial and technological flows. Domestically, they re-
introduced (or maintained) a number of market-based regulation mechanisms, and also – to 
different extents – private property rights on some means of production.  
 
2.3. Results in terms of development of the productive forces and poverty reduction 
have been spectacular in the case of China, very favorable in that of Vietnam, and mixed in 
other cases (see the  Appendix).    
It is also fair to acknowledge, however, that market-oriented reforms have contributed 
to rising social inequality, and that the fabric of China’s and Vietnam’s economies is so 
                                               
23 Pre- Raùl Cuba and North Korea are obvious exceptions. Even in the latter country, however, some market-
oriented reforms appear to be taking place (see Talmadge 2015). 
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complex that their very socialist nature is far from clear-cut. In fact, no one – included their 
own governments24 - claims that they constitute full-fledged examples of socialism.  
Many  observers would acknowledge that in both countries there are elements of 
socialism25 (such as the large weight of the State in the economy, and the very relevant role of 
SOEs, State-Controlled Mixed Enterprises and other non-private firms), as well as elements of 
capitalism and even of pre-capitalist MPs (in the most backward rural areas). Therefore, they 
see China and Vietnam as mixed economies with both socialist and capitalist features. Many 
other analysts are inclined to believe that they have now become fully capitalist in all but name 
– or that they have anyway embarked on a path that cannot but lead to such an outcome. 
 
 
2.4.   A quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War the relation of forces in the world 
economy has not fallen back to its pre-1917 situations. Colonialism in its traditional form is 
dead. Global trade and financial relations among countries at different level of economic and 
technological development are prevalently governed by rule-based market relations rather than 
sheer imperialist spoliation.26 Due to the emergence of China, the BRICs and other developing 
countries, the distribution of economic and financial power in the world is now multi-polar to 
a large extent. 
                                               
24 Official interpretations range from stating that their societies are still in a very backward stage of socialism to 
acknowledge that they are not (yet) even socialist in proper sense, but only “socialist-oriented”. The latter 
expression may be variously interpreted as meaning an objective fact (i.e. China and Vietnam are actually 
moving towards socialism) or a declaration of intent (their governments and   peoples are trying hard to advance 
in the direction of socialism). See Nguyen Phu Trong 2012, CPC 2013, Xinhua 2015. 
25 At least, according to positive criteria. 
 
26 This is not to deny that neo-colonial power relations have not disappeared in many areas of the world, or that 
the formal regulation and the practical functioning of international  trade and financial  relations do not 
disproportionally favour the most advanced capitalist powers, while penalizing most  of the developing world.  
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Thus, the profound changes occurred worldwide since the time of Marx suggest that 
contemporary international relations of production and exchange  are prevalently market-
based,  yet no longer resemble those typical of the XIXth  century or the first half of  the XXth 
century. On one hand, it is no longer thinkable to expect these relations to change radically in 
a relatively short period of time, being substituted by a full-fledged socialist MP on a global 
scale.   On the other hand, many elements of the traditional global capitalist order have been 
modified by history, and the viability of national, at least partly non capitalistic development 
paths  has now increased in many areas of the world. 
These considerations suggest – as a provisional working assumption - that the prevalent 
MP worldwide is no longer fully capitalistic. On the other hand, the globalization process offers 
also to socialist-oriented countries opportunities for international economic integration – while 
diminishing, with respect to the past, the degrees of freedom of which planners may dispose in 
trying to pursue non-capitalist development paths.   
         It is therefore preferable to refer neutrally to the prevalent MP worldwide as the Modern 
Mode of Production.    The dominant, modern MP is predicated on market-based social 
relations of production and exchange. In my view, actually, as the state of such relations at the 
global level can evolve only along the dimension of history’s long time, their market-based 
foundations are bound to prevail globally for an indefinitely long period, thereby justifying the 
strong and holistic term MP. If this sweeping assumption is true, it implies as a corollary that 
any attempt to overhaul it through quixotic, subjective political action would be futile and 
counterproductive.27  
                                               
27 However, in order to maintain a balanced analytical approach, it is always crucial to avoid falling in the too 
common pitfalls of traditional "economism", revolving around the fabulous fictional character named "homo 
economicus". The economic structure, albeit crucial, is but one of the dimensions shaping human life, and all-too-
important and ever-evolving “cultural factors interact in a complex way both with the economic mode of 
production (the so-called “material” basis of society) and with the psychological orientations and conflicts of the 
15 
 
 
2.5.  The arguments put forward in the preceding sub-sections suggest that the 
categories of SEF and MP are to be understood as tools aimed to analyze some structural 
features of human societies existing as objects belonging to the space of historical time.28  
 The fundamentally market- and value- based nature of the modern MP cannot,  and will 
not be undermined in the foreseeable future, as it intrinsically corresponds to the historical 
degree and form of development of humankind’s evolution of social relations and to its 
relationship with nature. Yet, at a theoretical level, it is crucial to stress that the market-based 
foundations of the modern MP are not synonymous with capitalism (and much less with its 
neo-liberal variant). As a matter of fact, in the context of the basic global compatibilities 
determined by the MP, several diverse forms of socioeconomic systems can develop in 
different points of space and time as a result of various factors, including scientific analysis 
and conscious collective action. 
 Historical experience is consistent with this theoretical framework. Nowadays, 
capitalist relations of production and exchange (leading to forms of - mostly oligopolistic- 
competition), and therefore of class power, are both dominant and hegemonic worldwide. 
However, their dominance is neither complete, unchallenged, or inevitable for an endless 
period of time. Embryonic non-capitalist capitalist relations of production and exchange and 
of class power have been emerging, following an uneven pattern, in some areas of the 
periphery, since the first decades of the past century. In some of these areas socialist-oriented  
                                               
persons involved” (Hermann 2012, p.5, Note 2), in a context where individual decisions are the product of a very 
"non-linear" bounded rationality-based process . 
 
28 In turn, the latter is sub-set of the much longer-term process of life’s evolution on Earth. As the dialectic 
between competition and cooperation is a key founding characteristic of all living beings and therefore also, a 
fortiori, of human societies (see Novak 2011). 
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SEFs29  have been established. Some of them eventually collapsed due to endogenous and 
exogenous factors, while others have proved resilient (at least so far), and new ones have 
emerged.  In many other countries in the periphery non-socialist forms of mixed economies 
prevail, some of them are led by progressive political forces pursuing novel human 
development-centered national development strategies. The advanced, traditionally dominant 
core capitalist countries produce a constantly shrinking share (well below 50%) of the world 
GDP30. Moreover, they are mired in the longest and deepest crisis of their history, and are 
sliding back into pre-Keynesian, regressive relations of production and exchange. 
 
2.6.   In my view, it has to be recognized that historical experience has shown that modern 
economies are characterized by a high and ever-increasing degree of complexity.31 This 
complexity is linked to the continuous and stratified knowledge accumulation on the part of 
numerous and diverse agents, and does not allow for simplistic or over-centralized solutions to 
the core problem of governance. Such a degree of complexity and the related dispersion of 
relevant information can partly be counteracted, but not fully overruled by the increasing 
sophistication of information and computing technologies. Material balances-based centralized 
administrative planning (while useful to a limited extent, to perform basic tasks under given 
circumstances) is inadequate as a sole device to deal with such complexities. Therefore, 
                                               
29 The term socialist-oriented SEF refers broadly to  a country run in a rather stable context by a political force  
declaring officially to be engaged in steering a process aimed at establishing, strengthening, or improving and 
further developing   a socialist socioeconomic system, and actually implementing economic policies that are 
broadly consistent with the socialist goal. A the second condition  is not easy to verify, it is likely  that external 
observers might disagree on whether a specific  country is in fact a  socialist-oriented SEF or not. In any case, 
the term “socialist-oriented” is much weaker than the term “socialist”.   
30       According to World Bank estimates ( in PPP terms), the share of global output   accruing to rich OECD 
member countries     was 45% in 2010 and 43% in 2013  (source: World Bank WDI).    
31 Lenin was popularly believed to have said that, once capitalist exploitation was overcome, the governance of 
the state and the economy would become such an easy task that “any cook can govern the state”. In fact his view 
ws rather the opposite one: “ We know that an unskilled labourer or a cook cannot immediately get on with the 
job of state administration.” Lenin 1917b.  
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simplistic, over-centralized solutions to the core problem of economic governance and 
planning are neither efficient not ultimately sustainable. 
 
2.7.    The socialization of the principal means of production and the control on the part 
of the state of the commanding heights of the economy do not bring about a complete  social 
homogenization .   Therefore, economic governance and planning cannot constitute an not 
over-centralized, autistic exercise, but shall take fully into account the constraints posed by 
objectively-existing social relations of production and exchange, individuals’ incentives and 
aspirations, objectively-existing social relations of production and exchange, and the degree of 
consciousness of different population groups. The complexity of economic governance and 
strategic development planning latter must be dealt with via partly price- and market-based 
regulation mechanisms 
Advancing towards socialism under the constraints imposed by the modern MP implies 
the adoption of an adequate planning approach, solidly founded on a vast array of information 
and forecasts, and which must necessarily be ultimately market-compatible32 and intrinsically 
democratic.  
With respect to private agents, planners can leverage the State’s  potentially superior 
(albeit not infinite) information-gathering, processing and  forecasting capabilities to provide 
the foundations for a conscious,  forward-looking an effort to shepherd the endogenous trends 
emerging from the market. In this endeavour, they can try to utilizing an array of diverse policy 
tools aimed at optimally shaping the trajectories of investment, innovation, and relative 
                                               
32 A ‘market-compatible’ economic activity is one that, even if it is not necessarily directly geared towards 
selling in presently existing markets, is however oriented towards the creation of future market competitiveness 
in advanced sectors, usually via a more roundabout  and long innovation and production process (see Gabriele 
2001).  
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prices33. The condition of ultimate market compatibility of this kind of planning, however, 
imposes a significant prudential limitation on its degrees of freedom, as the outcome in the 
medium- and long-term (especially in terms of domestic prices structure) shall not be allowed 
to diverge unduly from the global structure of relative prices.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
3.    Concluding remarks 
 
3.1.   "Laws" of socialist-oriented economic development? 
  
Hinting at the existence of “laws” of socialist-oriented socioeconomic development 
which are of general applicability can be considered so far as little more than an informed 
                                               
33 A potentiality   is not by itself a fact. Socialist-oriented countries’ record in promoting and broadly steering 
technical progress and innovative activities, in particular, is not very satisfactory so far. 
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working assumption.  Even if these “laws” did in fact exist, it would be foolish on the part of 
any analyst to pretend having fully discovered and properly understand all of them. 
Moreover, the  economy of a paper like the present one does not allow for an in-depth 
analysis of the extremely complex and contradictory reforms implemented or attempted in 
presently-existing socialist-oriented developing countries and of their outcomes in terms of 
economic, social, and human development. A few synthetic indicators and graphs illustrating  
some stylized facts are presented in the Appendix, which mostly focuses on China, Vietnam 
and Cuba. It is well known that the two Asian countries embarked since the late 1970s- early 
1980s on  a market-socialist path, while Cuba (due partly to the objective constraints imposed 
by the US embargo, and partly to the subjective  attitude  of the island’s leadership) maintained 
until recently34 a very centralized  command economy model.  
Within the boundaries imposed by such self-evident methodological disclaimers, I 
tentatively argue that after almost one century of attempts to establish and develop socialist-
oriented economic systems in various parts of the world, a few propositions of general and 
universal applicability can be synthesized. They are proposed in the following subsection. 
 
3.2. General principles governing and constraining development strategies in the XXI 
century 
 
 
Any country’s economy is constituted by two macro-sectors: the productive macro-
sector and the non-productive macro-sector. Accordingly, the productive macro-sector 
generates a surplus. The non-productive sector (which includes all public services, 
among them essential ones such as health and education) does not. Therefore, the only 
                                               
34 The   process of “updating” of the Cuban socialist model  was officially launched by the VI Congress of the 
Communist party of Cuba in April, 2011 (see Castro 2011). Its  gradual  implementation is still in an infant 
stage. 
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way to maintain a sustainable socioeconomic equilibrium is to earmark towards the 
non-productive macro-sector part of the surplus generated by the productive macro-
sector.  
Within the boundaries imposed by this accounting constraint (which is formally 
corresponds to an  identity similar to those of standard national accounts) , the essence 
of planning consists  in an array of consistent state-orchestrated interventions  aimed at 
changing what, in absence of such policy actions,  would be the “spontaneous” outcome 
of the interplay of domestic and foreign market forces. The purpose of such a proactive 
attitude on the part of the State is to induce policy-led resource transfers that benefit 
sectors, subsectors or population groups at the expense of others. In turn, these transfers 
are aimed at achieving distributive, social and environmental goals (such as lessening 
inequalities, fostering public services, or protecting nature), or at accelerating economic 
development.  
 
The latter set of interventions  are commonly referred to as industrial policies, and can 
include a number of actions  aimed at earmarking resources (via administrative or price-related 
tools) towards strategic sectors, such as infrastructure, capital goods, high-tech industries, R&D 
and S&T activities.35  
If properly formulated and implemented, industrial policies can indeed be quite 
effective. For this to be the case, however, industrial policies require two necessary conditions 
to be satisfied, as planners must: 
                                               
35 The rationale behind industrial policies is the belief that the automatic working of market forces 
would induce a sub-optimal allocation of resources - due to an array of well-known systemic  failures,  
such as the speculative and opportunistic behavior of  private agents, the distortionary and risk-prone 
nature of the international and domestic private financial systems, and the pervasiveness of positive 
and negative externalities and information asymmetries.  
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● base their actions on a set of information that goes far beyond market signals (without, of 
course, ignoring the need to properly analyze and interpreter market signals as well); 
● be endowed with an adequate and effective set of administrative and non-administrative, 
direct and indirect policy tools.  
  Policy makers should always realize a simple, commonsensical fact of 
life: national States’ planning capabilities are limited – especially so in 
developing countries.  The domestic structure of relative prices (including 
the real wage) and the real exchange rate must be broadly consistent with the  
structure of international prices.  As the State cannot control and manage all 
the economy in a direct fashion, it must concentrate its limited planning 
resources on what is really strategically crucial. Among other things, this 
implies that monetary-commercial relations must be allowed to prevail in 
non-strategic sectors. 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Principles governing socialist-oriented development strategies 
The considerations put forward in the preceding sub-section apply, by and large, to any 
economy, and thus also to socialist-oriented ones. Therefore, they can be regarded as basic 
principles constraining the policy space of socialist-oriented planners in a binding fashion. 
However, in my view, the theoretical and empirical arguments discussed in the other sections 
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of this paper allow to identify other economic “laws” that apply specifically to the subset of 
developing countries constituted by socialist-oriented SEF36. The main ones are as follows: 
(i) The LV cannot be thoroughly superseded under socialism.  Policy 
makers operating in a socialist-oriented context must acknowledge 
that attempting to plan against the constraints implied by the LV 
inevitably generates strains and tensions that can be satisfactorily 
governed only up to a point. From a practical  vantage point of  
policy making, socialist planners can go a long way if they 
basically: 
a) respect  the socialist principle of distribution (i.e. try to favor the 
emergence of a structure of wages that is approximately consistent to 
individuals’ labor productivity); 
 b) do not push state-mandated inter-sectoral transfers  too far, and thus do 
not allow the domestic  structure of relative prices to depart excessively 
from that of international prices. 
(ii)  The allocation of labor, capital and other resources in the 
productive sectors should not be a blind mechanical byproduct of 
the LV. However, planners should avoid to unduly challenge the 
law beyond a reasonable point. Well-meant attempts to excessively 
penalize the productive macro-sector in order to fund public 
services risk to cause a progressive de-capitalization of the former, 
                                               
36 These principles circumscribe and identify an inner, smaller policy space internal to the former one. 
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weakening the surplus-generating capability of the whole country, 
and leading to economic decay. 
(iii) As far as they are financially sustainable, traditional state-mandated, centralized 
transfers from the productive to the non-productive macro-sector should be 
maintained and possibly strengthened, while the former is being reformed. 
These transfers are indispensable to ensure the public, free or quasi-free 
provision of basic services such as health and education, according to the 
principle of non-market-based universal access.37 As a general rule, efforts 
should not be spared to avoid any form of   privatization and the establishment 
of heavy user fees. In this respect, the negative experiences of China and 
Vietnam in the 1980s and 1990s should not be forgotten.38 
(iv) Resist any suggestion to privatize and liberalize financial services. A very 
strong and centralized control on the strategic core39 of the domestic financial 
system - overwhelmingly constituted by public banks and other non-private 
financial institutions - must be enforced.40   
(v) Market-oriented reforms should focus essentially on the productive macro-
sector. Socialist-oriented countries where glaring allocative distortions have not 
been adequately tackled so far should urgently re-establish (both formally and 
in practice) the basic tenets of the LV.  Relative prices must be rationalized and 
indispensable key markets must be re-constituted (including wholesale and 
                                               
37 This principle is broadly consistent with the communist principle of distribution. 
38 See Gabriele 2006, Gabriele and Schettino 2008a,b. 
39 Market-based competition can be promoted in non-strategic areas among private and cooperative financial 
SMEs, including credit unions (see Vidal 2012).  
40 Once a certain degree of development has been reached in a not-so-small country, it is probably 
necessary to  establish a national stock exchange market as well. However – far from being wantonly 
liberalized – this market must remain strongly controlled and regulated 
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inputs markets and markets for at least some capital goods).  Little can be 
accomplished in terms of substantial systemic improvement until this necessary 
condition is satisfied.  
 
(vi) SOEs, with few exceptions, are not a form of enterprise conducive to the 
development of agriculture (or, at least, of most agricultural subsectors, first of 
all the food-producing ones). Attempts to enact a mandatory transformation of 
rural SOEs into formally, yet not really autonomous cooperatives are bound to 
fail, especially if they take place in absence of at least partly functioning 
markets. 
 
(vii) Without ignoring the profound differences between the agrarian structure of 
each socialist-oriented developing country, experience appears to show that (at 
least, during the initial stage of the reforms) the most feasible and promising 
path to increase agricultural productivity and enhance food self-sufficiency is 
to re-establish to a large extent farmers’ individual property rights, promoting 
rural household farms as the basic production units in the countryside. In a 
parallel fashion, the formation of (mainly credit-, trade-, and other service-
oriented) authentic, bottom-up cooperatives and other forms of associations 
might be promoted. In this respect, it is important to realize fully that no 
cooperative can properly function in any sector in absence of autonomy and 
markets. 
 
(viii) Industrial and infrastructural SOEs must be profoundly restructured. In this 
context, the general and universal validity of the motto “grasping the large and 
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letting the small go” must be fully assumed by policy makers. The number of 
SOEs shall be drastically curtailed, and the remaining ones (exclusively 
concentrated in strategic sectors) should be strengthened, capitalized and 
thoroughly reformed, establishing an adequate incentive structure for managers 
and workers alike and enhancing enterprise autonomy.  
 
(ix) In strategic sectors that are not intrinsically monopolistic, the role of market 
mechanisms should be increased, with the goal of establishing forms of 
managed and regulated oligopolistic41 competition among few reformed SOEs 
in the domestic market.  Strong national SOEs  can also successfully compete 
with foreign TNCs in increasingly concentrated international 
markets.42Domestic and foreign private firms might as well be allowed to 
compete with SOEs in some of these markets, under firmly regulated conditions.  
 
(x) The structure of SOEs’ property rights in non-monopolistic markets should 
undergo a gradual transformation. Traditional, centralized and administrative 
hands-on forms of state control should be superseded, as well as most forms of  
physical planning. Taking into account the progressive re-establishment of the 
LV, state control of SOEs should undergo a progressive transition towards 
modern, flexible, indirect, finance-based mechanisms, with a view at 
                                               
41 This class of SOEs is formed by large and advanced SOEs or state-controlled mixed enterprises.  They tend  
to operate in markets where only few similarly large enterprises can compete, and which are therefore 
oligopolistic.  
42 “During…capitalist globalization, industrial concentration occurred in almost every sector…the number of 
leading firms in most industrial sectors shrank and the degree of industrial concentration increased greatly…“ 
Nolan 2012, Section 2.1. Globalization and industrial concentration. Using data from 2006-09, Nolan showed  
that the number of globally dominant businesses in most  globalizing manufacturing sectors ranged from two to 
a maximum of ten. Dominant firms controlled between half and all of the world market. See also Wolf 2013. 
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establishing various tiers of state-controlled corporations as the core structure 
of public industry. 
 
(xi) Most industrial and services SMEs cannot be successfully managed as SOEs. 
Therefore, small and medium-sized SOEs should be transformed in other types 
of collective, cooperative or private  firms. In the worst scenario - if they are 
hopelessly loss-making and no better solution is available- they should simply 
be closed down. In some cases privatization can be in practice the best solution. 
The transformation of some formerly state-owned SMEs into authentic 
cooperatives might be actively promoted, but always taking into account the big 
caveat mentioned in para (v). Mandatory attempts to (formally or informally) 
force SME workers to take over their - often ailing - enterprises as collective 
owners would inevitably fail, thereby jeopardizing also the perspectives for a 
future recovery of the cooperative movement.  
 
(x) The reform strategy outlined above inevitably implies by itself a significant 
deterioration in the distribution of primary incomes, with a marked increase in 
inequality. Such a deterioration is due only in part to the application of the socialist 
principle “to each one according to her wok” and to the superseding of excessive 
egalitarianism. In practice, the re-appearance of non-labor forms of income in those 
areas of the economy where capitalist relations of production and exchange are 
allowed to be re-established can be controlled, but not totally avoided. 
 
(xi) However, it is also well-known that the degree of de facto inequality in a poorly 
functioning socialist-oriented economy can actually be quite high as well, due 
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among other things to the proliferation of illegal and informal rent-seeking 
behaviors of individual economic agents (see Romanò 2012). If properly managed, 
the transition towards a new socialist-oriented economic model can succeed in 
substantially diminish the diffusion of these negative phenomena, thereby reining 
in the increase in overall   income and social inequality.  
 
(xii) Governments in socialist-oriented countries dispose in principle of relatively ample 
policy space, and of several potentially well-targeted and fine-tuned policy tools. 
They can use them   to control, stop and eventually invert the trend towards 
increasing inequality, once the transition towards a new type of socialist economic 
model is basically accomplished. The main instruments available to reforming 
socialist-oriented countries to rein in increasing inequality trends are two. Neither 
of them is new, yet their potential is often underestimated. One is the consolidation 
and (once the economic recovery of productive sectors makes sufficient resources 
available) the strengthening and expansion of public services provided on a non-
market basis, according to principles such as need and/or universal access. The 
other is the establishment of a modern and effective system of progressive taxation. 
Appendix.   Cuba, China, Vietnam and Laos: four socialist-oriented SEFs in a 
comparative perspective* 
 
This section aims at illustrating and discussing some basic facts on the structural 
economic and demographic characteristics and the main features of economic and social 
development in four socialist-oriented SEFs (i.e.  Cuba, China, Vietnam and Lao PDR) in a 
comparative perspective. 
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Graphs 1, 2 and 3 show that all these socialist-oriented SEFs have been performing far above 
the developing countries’ average in terms of human development. Their rates of improvement 
in three key human development indicators - child mortality, life expectancy, and female 
literacy rate – are superior to those of (far richer) high-income non-OECD countries, and in 
many cases even the absolute levels of the indicators are better. Trends in terms of the most 
well-known synthetic indicator of human development - UNDP’s Human Development Index 
(HDI) – show a similar picture. China’s average annual rate of improvement of the HDI, at 
1.52% per year, is the highest among all countries belonging to the very high and high human 
development grouping. Cuba’s record (+0.73% per year) is among the best among countries 
with very high human development, especially so when compared to other Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Vietnam and Lao PDR also performed   very well, and even more so in 
terms of a new indicator, the inequality-adjusted HDI43  (see UNDP 2015). 
Trends in extreme, absolute poverty are also generally favorable in comparative terms, 
especially for the three Asian countries where (differently from Cuba) this phenomenon was  
still dramatically severe – to varying degrees -  in the 1970s (see Graph 4).  
Conversely, the evolution of the structural composition of the GDP shows major 
differences between China, Vietnam and Lao PDR, on one hand, and Cuba, on the other hand. 
The Asian countries have undergone a process of rapid industrialization (reflected by a high 
and growing share of industry in the GDP), while Cuba’s economy has experienced de-
industrialization and an extremely pronounced trend towards tertiarization (see Graphs 5 and 
6).  GDP per capita growth has been very fast in the three Asian countries, Vietnam and Lao 
PDR, not so in Cuba. Yet, its absolute level appears to be still higher in Cuba than even in 
China (see Graphs 7, 8).  
                                               
43  The UNDP was unable to estimate the inequality-adjusted HDI for China and Cuba. 
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* All data in this appendix were sourced from the World Bank WDI database. 
 
Graph 1 Mortality rate under 5 
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Graph 2  Life expectancy 
 
Graph 3 Literacy rate, female adult ( %) 
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Graph 4   Poverty PPP % 1.25 $ 
 
 
Graph 5  Services (GDP share, %) 
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Graph 6 Industry (GDP share, GDP %) 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 7  GDP PC growth 
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Graph 8  GDP per capita, PPP (constant)  
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